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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
RICHARD F. McKEAN,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.

:
:

MICHAEL W. McBRIDE, ALPINE LTD., :
and FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE
INSURANCE COMPANY, GEODYNE II, :
a Utah general partnership,
DAN C. SIMONS, and ARDEN J.
:
BODELL,

Case No. 920705-CA

Defendants/Appellants.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Plaintiff agrees with defendants1 jurisdiction statement.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The first issue is whether this appeal has been made moot
except for determining the effect of plaintiff's attorney's lien.
A Satisfaction of Judgment was filed by associates of defendants
who acquired the plaintiff McKean's interest in the judgment at an
execution sale.

If the court determines that the Satisfaction of

Judgment resolved the issues in dispute, it is unnecessary to
address the other issues raised on appeal.

(See the Findings of

Fact and Conclusions of Law entered by Judge Rokich May 5, 1993,
pursuant to the temporary remand order of this court. Record, pp.

2
1799-1800)

The issue of the effect and amount of plaintiff's

attorney's lien is the subject of a separate lawsuit filed pursuant
to the trial court's order at the time this matter was temporarily
remanded by this court to the trial judge.
Defendants have stated seven issues for review.
need not be addressed if the suit has become moot.

These

Defendants

represent that each of their issues are issues of law to which the
court need accord no deference to the ruling of the lower court.
By identifying all issues as being issues of law, defendants accept
the factual findings of the court as being correct.

The Utah

Supreme Court has held that trial court findings should not be
disturbed on appeal where appellant does not attempt to marshall
evidence to demonstrate error.

Doelle v. Bradley, 784 P.2d 1176

(Utah 1989) By defendants' identification of all issues as issues
of law, the Findings of Fact should be accepted as accurate. This
diminishes the need for plaintiff to respond to the references in
defendants' brief to factual evidence other than the court's
findings of fact.

However, some of the issues as stated in

defendants' brief misinterpret or misapply the court's factual
findings.

These are addressed as follows:
Defendants' Issue "A" incorrectly states that "Cook,

Lamoreaux, Hansen, and New Empire Development had previously
conveyed their interest in the property to Child."

To the

contrary, the court specifically found that there had not been a
conveyance of the New Empire Group's interest in said property to

3
Child.

(Finding of Fact 29)

Defendants' issue is based on facts

contrary to the court's findings.
Defendants' Issue "B" asks:
holding

Did the lower court err in

that the Uniform Real Estate Contract

between Cook,

Lamoreaux, Hansen, and New Empire Development, as Sellers, and
Child, as Buyer, was nothing more than an option, which was never
exercised?

In Finding of Fact 29 (Record, p. 679) and Conclusion

of Law 5 (Record, p. 681-682), the court determined that the
essential elements of delivery and consideration were not present.
Documents were placed in escrow subject to future conditions
occurring.

The court found this issue factually in favor of

plaintiff. The issue as framed overlooks the significant findings
of the court before the judge characterized the proposal as being
"no more than an option that was never exercised."
Defendants' Issue "C" is incomplete in its reference to
the status of Myron Child's bankruptcy proceedings.

The issue as

framed fails to state that Child's chapter 11 bankruptcy was
dismissed without discharge and that Child's assets including his
contractual rights except for the security interest in Traverse
Mountain reverted to him.

(See Finding of Fact 33, Record p. 679)

Furthermore, the court found that the New Empire Group's interest
in the property had never been conveyed to Child.
Fact 29, Record, p. 678)

(See Finding of

The court further found that the New

Empire Group's claim against Alpine Ltd. had been assigned to
plaintiff.

(Findings of Fact 21 and 22)

4
Defendants1 Issue "G" reads: Did the trial court err in
refusing to hold that McKean's claims be completely set off against
amounts owed by his assignors to Alpine under the Alpine Contract?
This leaves incorrect inferences.

The court found factually that

at the time of default there were no sums owed by McKean or his
assignors to Alpine.

(See Finding of Fact 28, Record p. 678)

Defendants' issues as framed suggest facts not supported by the
Record and inconsistent with the trial court's ruling.

Plaintiff

concurs that defendants' issues "D," "E," and "F" are questions of
law applied on the basis of the facts set forth in the court's
findings.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff (McKean) concurs with the defendants' statement
under the heading "Statement of the Case" in defendants' Brief,
page 4.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Identification of the Parties
1.

Defendant Alpine Ltd. is a limited partnership that

entered into a contractual agreement on June 1, 1978, to sell real
property to New Empire Group. The contract was breached by Alpine,
Ltd., the primary defendant in this proceeding.

(Findings of Fact

3, 9, 10, Record 673-74)
2.

Defendants Michael McBride. Dan C. Simons, and Arden

J. Bodell were the general partners of defendant Geodvne II.

5
Defendant Geodyne II, acting through its general partners, was the
general partner of Alpine Ltd.

There were no other general

partners of defendants Alpine Ltd. or Geodyne II. (Finding of Fact
7, Record,

p.

673)

McBride,

Simons, and

Bodell

are named

defendants in their role as general partners, having an identity of
interest with defendants Alpine Ltd. and Geodyne II.
3.

The New Empire Group is a partnership consisting of

Myron B. Child, Jr. (hereafter "Child"), Ronald B. Cook (hereafter
"Cook"), Ray W. Lamoreaux

(hereafter "Lamoreaux"), Wendell P.

Hansen (hereafter "Hansen"), and New Empire Development Company
(hereafter "New Empire Development").
673-74)

(Findings of Fact 9, Record

The New Empire Group entered into a contract for purchase

of land from Alpine Ltd.

The contract was breached when Alpine

could not or would not deliver the land. These individuals are not
parties to these proceedings. The New Empire Group assigned their
cause of action for breach of contract to plaintiff McKean who had
paid $330,000 to Alpine Ltd. for the undelivered land.
4.

Richard McKean is the plaintiff.

In behalf of

himself and the New Empire Group, he paid $330,000 to Alpine for
which he was immediately entitled to the release of specified real
property.

The land was not delivered.

New Empire assigned its

cause of action to McKean, and this lawsuit for breach of contract
and other relief was brought in McKeanfs own behalf and under the
assignment.

6
Alpine-New Empire Contract
5. In 1978, the New Empire Group contracted to purchase
certain real property located near the Point of the Mountain
between Salt Lake and Utah Counties known as the Traverse Mountain
property.

(Findings of Fact 9 and 10 Record, pp. 673-74)
6.

The contract provided for the buyer to pay annual

payments of $330,000 and further provided that the buyer would have
the right to designate and receive land having a value of 2/3 of
the amount of payments made on the contract.
specified the manner of land selection.

The contract also

(Finding of Fact 26,

Record, p. 677)
McKean-New Empire Contract
7.

On June 7, 1979, McKean entered into a written

contract with the New Empire Group to acquire the Traverse Mountain
property which New Empire was acquiring from Alpine.
Fact 12, Record, p. 674)

(Finding of

Pursuant to the contractual agreement,

McKean timely paid the 1979 annual installment of $330,000 to
Alpine Ltd. through its escrow agent and specifically identified
the particular land to be released under the contract.

(Findings

of Fact 13 and 14, Record, pp. 674-75)
8.

At a meeting between McBride (Alpine), McKean, and

his attorney, land was selected and defendants agreed to release
specific land on Traverse Mountain to McKean which had a value of
$220,000. The promised land was never released to either McKean or
the New Empire Group.

(Finding of Fact 27, Record, p. 678)

7
9.

At the time McKean made the payment, the New Empire

Group was current in all its payments and was not in default in any
of the material conditions of the June 1, 1978, contract with
defendants. The court specifically found that defendants breached
their contract by failing to release to McKean or the New Empire
Group real property having 2/3 of the value of the $330,000
payment.

(Finding of Fact 28, Record, p. 678)
10.

Alpine Ltd. failed and refused to convey the

specified property to McKean or New Empire Group despite demand
letters sent by plaintiff to Alpine's agent and title company
(Finding of Fact 16, Record, p. 675) and a Notice of Default sent
to defendants McBride and Alpine (Finding of Fact 17, Record, p.
675) .
11. On September 20, 1980, Child offered to acquire the
New Empire Group's interest in the Alpine-New Empire Contract.
Child offered to pay $1.5 million for that interest within 18
months. However, the executed documents which would have given him
the opportunity to acquire said property were placed in escrow
conditioned upon not being released until Child paid the $1.5
million.

Child made no payments to the New Empire Group and the

contract and assignment were not delivered to him. The court found
that no consideration had been paid by Child for the right to
acquire said property and the contract documents or property had
not been delivered to him.
between

Child

and

the

The court ruled that the arrangements

other

New

Empire

Group

members

were

8
substantially
consideration.

the

same

as

an

option

entered

into

without

(Findings of Fact 29, Record, pp. 278-79) Physical

possession of the land remained with Alpine Ltd. during this
period. Neither Child nor New Empire had possession or use of the
subject property.
12.

Prior to the expiration of the 18 month period

during which Myron Child had the opportunity to acquire the subject
property

from the New Empire Group, he

filed

a chapter 11

bankruptcy. He claimed to have a $36/000,000.00 ownership interest
in the subject property.

Mr. Child obtained confirmation of a

bankruptcy plan which would require him to sell the property for
not less than $8,000,000.00 so that the secured positions of all
interested parties could be paid.
13.

(See Exhibit P-32)

When a buyer could not be found between 1982 and

1985 who could comply with the bankruptcy plan requirements, the
court ordered the bankruptcy trustee to sell the Traverse Mountain
property free and clear of liens at auction to the highest bidder.
In February 1985, the bankruptcy trustee sold the Traverse Mountain
property free and clear of liens to a consortium controlled by
Alpine Ltd. and the Child bankruptcy plan by its own terms became
null and void.

(Exhibit 32 at page 28 attached as Exhibit "I" to

defendants1 brief.) The purchase price at the bankruptcy sale was
only sufficient to pay administrative expenses of the bankruptcy
proceeding and to assume certain secured obligations which were
senior to Alpine Ltd.'s interest in the subject property.

The

9
assumed interests excluded the interests of McKean or his assignors
which were junior to Alpine's interest in the property.

(Finding

of Fact 31, Record, p. 679, Exhibit D-50)
14.

On June 12, 1985, all members of the New Empire

Group assigned to McKean their claims against Alpine Ltd. arising
out of defendants1 breach of contract.

(Finding of Fact 21;

Conclusion of Law 6)
15.

Any remaining

interest of Myron Child

in the

Traverse Mountain property sold by the bankruptcy trustee was
abandoned by the bankruptcy trustee pursuant to court order entered
July 10, 1985.
16.

(Finding of Fact 32)
On February 25, 1988, the Child bankruptcy was

dismissed without discharge. No effort was made by the bankruptcy
trustee to void the June 12, 1985, assignment given by Child to
McKean.

All remaining assets and contract rights reverted to

McKean.

(Finding of Fact 33)
17.

21, 1985.

McKean filed the Complaint in this action on June

(Findings of Fact 23, 31, Record 677-679)
18.

Defendants never conveyed the real estate required

to be conveyed to New Empire or Richard McKean nor have they
refunded any portion of the $330,000 paid by McKean.

(Finding of

Fact 34, Record, p. 680)
19. The trial court held that as a result of the breach
of contract by defendants in failing to convey land or refund the
money, McKean has been damaged in the sum of $220,000 together with

10
interest as provided by law calculated from the date McKean made
his $330,000 payment.
20.

The

(Finding of Fact 35, Record, p. 680)
trial

court

found

all

equity

issues in

plaintiff's favor and held:
As a matter of equity the property should have
been conveyed to plaintiff. The defendants
Michael McBride and Alpine Ltd. did not come
into court with "clean hands."
Defendants
Michael McBride and Alpine Ltd. should not be
able to benefit from the wrongful acts of
their partner. Defendants Michael McBride and
Alpine Ltd. should not be able to retain both
the land and the payment for the land. The
equitable issues should be found in favor of
plaintiff.
The following pertinent facts were determined on the
order entered by this court for temporary remand of this case and
were stipulated to between the parties.

(See Record, pp. 1800-

1803) These facts address the issue of whether the appeal is moot,
but do not pertain to the other issues on appeal.
21. Pursuant to a written agreement plaintiff's attorney
claims an attorney's lien on the cause of action and the proceeds
therefrom.

A copy of the Notice of Attorney's Lien was initially

filed with the Third Judicial District Court on September 11, 1990,
and was amended April 17, 1992.
22.

A court order was signed by Judge John Rokich on

March 20, 1992, pursuant to stipulation between plaintiff McKean
and defendants which provided a stay of execution in lieu of a
supersedeas bond, provided that certain assets would be pledged as
security

to

provide

payment

of

the

judgment

upon

appeal

11
affirmation. Pursuant to said Stipulation, documents were executed
and filed that gave public notice and perfected the security
interests with the Clerk of the Court as the secured party.

Said

order restrained the transfer of certain assets by the defendants.
23.

In a separate matter, in 1984 WestOne Bank, as the

successor to FMA Thrift and Loan Company and Moore Financial
Company

obtained

a judgment

against

several

individuals

and

businesses including Richard McKean in an action filed in the First
District Court, Box Elder County, State of Utah, entitled FMA
Thrift and Loan Company, et al. v. Alpha Leasing Company, et al.,
civil no. 17754.
24.

On September 28, 1991, WestOne Bank assigned a

portion of its interest in the judgment obtained in the WestOne
Bank action to Delaware Funding & Guaranty.

Delaware thereafter

executed on the judgment against McKean in the WestOne Bank action
by causing the judgment in the present case to be sold at an
execution

sale

conducted

Delaware, acting

by

the

Salt

Lake

County

Sheriff.

in the name of WestOne Bank, purchased the

judgment at the sale by bidding $10,000.00 of the WestOne judgment.
25.

At the sherifffs sale and prior

to bidding,

plaintiff McKeanfs attorney Ralph Tate announced to all present
that

the

judgment

was

subject

to

an

attorney's

lien

of

approximately $185,000 together with accruing interest. Because of
said execution sale, Delaware now claims to be the successor to
plaintiff McKean and to be the owner of all plaintiff McKean's

interest in this matter.
26,

Richard •'• Christenson

Fund inqii and Cluardnlv

'

primary

* w*

genera]

funding for Traverse Mountain and
<•* " i- i I '

credit.

Christenson ?? als;.
corporation

e president of Delaware

iristensoi s various corporations

provided a major portion
were

;

,, President

Franklin Financial

1Jtah

Frankl i r. Financial and defendant Geodyne

. .- • •-.

R

li I ? e s t m e n t s

I td

a

11 are

I J tal: I

I ii in :i ted

Partnership

)efendant A l p i n e , Ltd., is a limited partner of "TR

Investments

T h e collateral pledged as security

incLudes

pinp L;

interest

Januar
represent i •
&

Guaranty

'
whic^

in this matter

. * investments, Ltd.

y~r<

Richar*

-

Christenson,
•

.laimed

successor

: e Fi u id :i ng
^ plaintiff

McKean's interest In this action, executed and filed a Satisfaction
II* hid'imont i, i h i in
28.

i i mini >i i nn| • ! tt.iMy M'/Ke-m"' ••• | PI< icj<n#"»•

Plaintiff 1

ittorney

had no knowledge

r

agreement or assignment between the parties until January :
.md

h.iiii i l o t : < i J I I M M I I <>il I

I lie s.il i s i a c t ioi

it

I IIP j u d g m e n t and * \z

not been paid any sums pursuant to his attorney"s lien
herein.
29

The parties through their

respective

attorneys

stipulated in open court that t h e assets which have been pledged in
I i em I.I I r"i s u p e r s e d e a s

order

Ibni'iidl wi nil I nil in it lav i e . l e a s e t j , w 11, hoi it

of the court after an equitable

I HI I Ihi »ii

acti on to b e filed

by

plaintiff's counsel as to the validity and amount of plaintiff's
counsel's attorney's lien is determined.
30.

Pursuant to the trial court's order on temporary

remand of this appeal, plaintiff's counsel has brought an action in
equity for a determination of his right to enforce his attorney's
lien.

Said action is currently pending in the Third Judicial

District Court as case no. 930902810CN.
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' STATEMENT OF FACTS
The following items in defendants1 Statement of Facts are
significantly incorrect and are inconsistent with the findings of
the trial judge.
In Statement of Fact "C" on page 6 of defendants' brief,
defendants represent that New Empire Development conveyed its
interest in the Traverse Mountain property to Myron Child. This is
an incorrect statement of the court's Finding of Fact 29 which
reads:
29.
On September 20, 1980, New Empire
Development, Hansen, Cook, and Lamoreaux as
sellers entered into an agreement with
defendant
Child
whereby
Child
had
an
opportunity to acquire the remaining interest
of Hansen, Cook, and Lamoreaux in the June 1,
1978, contract with Alpine upon payment of
$1.5 million. Said Contract and an assignment
were to be placed in escrow conditional upon
not being released until Child paid said sum.
Said payment of $1.5 million was to be paid
within 18 months.
Child made no payments
pursuant
to
said
agreement
either
as
consideration
or as payment under the
agreement. The Contract and assignment were
not delivered. No consideration was paid by

14
Child for said option agreement.
Childfs
bankruptcy was filed before the option period
expired. The agreement was at best no more
than an option that was never exercised by
Myron Child or the bankruptcy trustee.
The court's Conclusion of Law 5 reads:
5>
T h e option to assign the interest of
New Empire and Cook, Lamoreaux, and Hansen to
Myron Child on September 30, 1980, was never
exercised or consummated.
The proposed
assignment was subject to Child giving
consideration, exercising the option, and
meeting
escrow
conditions
for document
delivery. Consideration was not paid and the
documents placed in escrow were not delivered
to Child. The conditions of escrow were not
met and the transaction was not consummated.
The effect of the purported assignment was to
create an option with Myron Child which was
never exercised. The interest of Myron Child
that became subj ect to the bankruptcy
proceeding of Myron Child did not include the
interests of other partners of New Empire.
Howevei
bankruptcy court had and
exercised authority to sell the entire
Traverse Mountain property free and clear of
liens without adjudication of claims and
interests.

There was not a conveyance
piYipprty

f i c ill 1 in 1 IMP i

•

interest :

b

:eptanct;

deliver y of the contract was conditioned
occurred a\

Traverse Mountain
• i

-r events tha* r-e. * :•

therefore there was no conveyance.
c!
::: " J " ::: i i, page 9 of defendants1 brief,, the Statement

of

Fact

discusses

Myr on

Child's

Third

Amended

Plar

Reorganization but fails to state that
never consummated and became null and void by its ow11 terms. The
bankruptcy proceeding was dismissed without discharge.

(See

15
Finding of Fact 33, Record p. 680)
accepted

plan

required

a

Despite the fact that Child's

minimum

property

sale

price

of

$8,000,000.00, the plan was never carried through. Ultimately the
bankruptcy trustee sold the property free and clear of liens at an
auction without compliance with the bankruptcy plan.

Shortly

thereafter the bankruptcy dismissal occurred without discharge or
payment to creditors.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

The matter should be dismissed as being moot except

for determination at the trial court level of the effect of
plaintiff's attorney's lien.

This is because a Satisfaction of

Judgment has been filed by defendants' business associates who
acquired plaintiff's interest in the judgment at an execution sale.
In the event the court does not dismiss the appeal as being moot,
the

following

summary

of

history

and

arguments

should

be

considered.
2. In 1978 defendant Alpine Ltd. contracted with the New
Empire Group to sell certain real property known as Traverse
Mountain.

The contract provided for annual minimum payments of

$330,000.00 and a partial release of land equal to 2/3 of the value
of sums paid.

In 1979 New Empire contracted with plaintiff McKean

for him to pay the annual payment and receive the designated land.
Pursuant

to the contract, McKean paid defendant

Alpine Ltd.

$330,000 and designated the land to be received. Defendants failed

16
and refused +-~ release land worth $220, n n n as required under the
contract c
re so] v

refund plaintiff's money
••

nsuccessful efforts to

t -

*,

T 73C

'• , . <

unable or unwilling to deliver good title -

* <

*

u:d

Myron Child offered to buy out the other" New Empi

.

J1

*

intof est in I he contract with Alpine Ltd. if he could obtain the
necessary financial resources.

Contract documents consisting

i

real estate
deliver to *

* •- • '^ ^

^00 purchase price.

trial court properly found that Child did not pay

i

.v

The

onsideration

111 t. onip J e t: o ir11 •. aoqi J j s 11; i on r vt\\ i i rements and
interest of the other New Empire Group partners

acquire the

in the subject

property.
3.

Myron, Child filed

proceeding.

When

Child

automat i oa 1 I v nioyotJ

aiirlP

filed

a

chapter 1 ] bankruptcy

bankruptcy,

II t * i»11

bankruptcy

law

M't «««ii ,i f 1 ert j inj ||H> properly

between February 1982 and February 198b. McKean was unable to meet
the conditions

bankruptcy plan

ordered ' he T"
property was sold

•

'*

*

--

)ino»pei"io

free and clear <;:

bankrupts

*
i

L
-

v • *

°

bankruptcy

trustee, McKean (individually and as assignee < '
flroup' o i ntererit) pur; v ij defendant Alpine Ltd. and its general
partners for dollar damages or equitable relief to recover his
$330,000.

McKean'ii

i ojlil

I

i <;*i-m n i o

upeci ( ir fjerfoi iiiiaiioe of

delivery of land had been eliminated by the bankruptcy court action
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in selling the Traverse Mountain real estate free of liens.
Defendants claim that the bankruptcy courtfs order approving the
bankruptcy plan of Myron Child encompasses determinations that are
res judicata.

The trial court found that the issues involving

plaintiff McKean were not barred under the principle of res
judicata.

There was not an identity of issues and parties for

application of this doctrine.

The bankruptcy court did not

adjudicate any rights of the parties.
estate.

It only sold the real

In addition, the bankruptcy order became "null and void"

by its own terms when the plan failed.

The bankruptcy court order

also only governed Child's interest in the subject property.

It

did not govern either McKeanfs or the interests of the other New
Empire

assignees.

Only

the property

was

sold.

bankruptcy was ultimately dismissed without discharge.

The Child
All other

rights were reinstated.
4.

McKean's claim arises under a written contract that

provides for a six year statute of limitations.

The action was

filed within six years of Alpine's breach of contract.

Defendants

assert that the contract should be governed by a four year statute
of limitations.

The trial court found that the six year statute

applied, but that it would make no difference whether a four year
or six year statute is applicable because of the three year tolling
effect of the bankruptcy proceeding on the statute of limitations.
The Myron Child bankruptcy proceeding stayed any legal action
affecting the subject real estate for over three years from

February 198,!, to M a r c h 1 9 8 5 . W h e n t h e p r o p e r t y w a s so] d free of
liens, the optio

*

r e q u i r e specific p e r f o r m a n c e w a s eliminated as

a remedy

«
5

Alpine

4

inn w a s t i m e l y filed.

assertion that t h e judgment should b e

o f f s e t a g a i n s t sums subsequently owed by Alp," U P uncier; th*.
contract

"

i.i.Hly

i-iilnml

merit.

Th€? court found that at * < H

time McKean paid $330,000 and became entitled to have
conveyed,

A

there was

ass i gi lor s (the New Empire Group)

The failure of Alpine Ltd. * i

convey land precipitated total default on the contract.
never did corn <p) ' possess] cm ,->l thin \>\ cpei iy and never conveyed
land nor refunded any money to McKean or his assignors.
McKean were not expected

i ;•

New Empire

n

1 not or i run I (I in if convey p r o p e r t y for w h i c h it h a d b e e n fully
paid,

T h e r e f o r e , t h e court c o r r e c t l y found that t h e r e were

owing b y N e w Empire +•

A 11 > i no ,11" I lii • t; i mc o I i if; I\i111!' , . , ^,

I'lefondant A l p i n e would be entitled to any claim of setoff.
'ft

A l p i n e Ltd, h a s

.*.

J

- McKean or the New Empire

G r o u p t h e $33 0,000 or zom ' ey <=

asi required u n d e r t h e

contractual agreements between the parties.

McKean deposited his

$ 3 3 0 , 0 0 0 w i t h d e f e n d a n t A l p i n e ' s agent and d i d not receive riny I,II il
in refii
The matter was tried before Judge John Rokich
sitting witlunr
Mrmoi .indum

I.

±u n..
^ . .-.. ^ subsequently

«*
its F i n d i n g s
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Conclusions of Law finding in favor of plaintiff and against
defendants and awarded plaintiff $220,000 damages together with
interest thereon and court costs.

The $220,000 was based on the

value of the land which Alpine was contractually obligated to
release to McKean equal in value to 2/3 of the $330,000 payment to
Alpine by McKean.
This court is requested to determine either that the
appeal is moot or that the issues raised by appellants are without
merit, and affirm the trial court's decision in appellee's favor.
ARGUMENT
I
DEFENDANTS1 APPEAL SHOULD BE DISMISSED
EXCEPT AS TO ISSUES OF PLAINTIFFfS ATTORNEY'S LIEN
BECAUSE IT HAS BEEN MADE "MOOT" BY A
SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENT.
This action was brought by plaintiff McKean in his own
right

and

as an assignee

of Ron

Cook, Wendell

Hansen, Ray

Lamoreaux, and Myron Child, referred to herein as the "New Empire
Group," to recover damages or such other relief as the court deemed
appropriate for breach of a written contract to sell land.

The

court found in McKeanfs favor and ordered judgment accordingly.
Subsequently,

a creditor of McKean

(WestOne Bank) who had a

judgment against McKean sold a portion of its judgment against
McKean to Delaware Funding & Guaranty (Richard Christenson) which
was a business associate of the defendants. Delaware subsequently
executed on the judgment in this case and purchased this judgment
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at a sheriff's sale,

Delaware/Christenson then entered into

agreement with the defendants (appellants
|. h|P

in
1805
e:i!

] iKjicfinc?"nf

i I. In n J . iiidt t e r s a t i s f i e d

—

action) - ~- • •

('•!(

:er on Pending Motions - temporary remand; Record pp. 1799Because the judgment

satisfied,

. - I n r u r j u i t ilt11 v iiii i ii.i I H

attorney's

'

*

appeal

Ine e x t e n t

plaintif "^
. y.

;:. en attaches to the property pledged

supersedeas bond.

F rr -jt

That is an Issue in a s^pat'rit

which is pending In the Third Judicial District Court.
II
PLAINTIFF HAS A VALID CAUSE OF ACTION
AGAINST DEFENDANTS BOTH IN HIS OWN BEHALF
AND AS ASSIGNEE OF THE CLAIM OF THE PARTNERS
OF THE NEW EMPIRE GROUP AGAINST ALPINE LTD.
Tin..1 [.iarti.es iirkiLuwhidi.|u 1li.il ...is ui June 2b,
had paid $330,000 to Alpine Ltd

19i'y, McKean

Alpine, New Empire Group, and

McKean a]1 recognized that McKean had
return, for hi s payment

(Findings

McKean had an equitable interest

i . i.

.

he property

* Record, .
t;- ;< ^

was entitled L.C_

•. McK

equitable cause

i action against Alpine Ltd. to require delivery

of the land.

When McKean could no longer recover the land, he was

ontililed to f 11 f > rot ui ii

I lii.s IIIUIH< (/

'llir. was I isctl mi the written

agreements between Alpine and the New Empire Group and between
McKean and the New Empire Group and also upon " "" part performanrp
I >,, Mi/Kean b) Int. d e l w e r v

O-P +-he $

Alpine's

agent.
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McKean's payment was accepted by Alpine Ltd, The trial court found
all issues of equity in plaintiff's favor.

(Conclusion of Law 10,

Record, p. 12)
To avoid any question of McKean's right to proceed
against Alpine Ltd. and to stand in the position of all the
partners of New Empire Group, McKean obtained a written assignment
of each of the members of New Empire Group's right, title, and
interest arising under the contract with Alpine.

Said assignment

was given in consideration of McKean's agreement not to name
members of the New Empire Group as defendants in the lawsuit.
(Finding of Fact 22, Record, p. 676)
Appellants argue that Hansen, Cook, Lamoreaux, and New
Empire had sold their interest to Myron Child in 1980 and therefore
had

nothing

to

assign.

Appellants'

position

is

directly

contradictory to Finding of Fact 29 in which the court found as
follows:
29.
On September 20, 1980, New Empire
Development, Hansen, Cook, and Lamoreaux as
sellers entered into an agreement with
defendant
Child
whereby
Child
had
an
opportunity to acquire the remaining interest
of Hansen, Cook, and Lamoreaux in the June 1,
1978, contract with Alpine upon payment of
$1.5 million. Said Contract and an assignment
were to be placed in escrow conditional upon
not being released until Child paid said sum.
Said payment of $1.5 million was to be paid
within 18 months.
Child made no payments
pursuant
to
said
agreement
either
as
consideration
or as payment under the
agreement. The Contract and assignment were
not delivered. No consideration was paid by
Child for said option agreement.
Child's

bankruptcy was filed before the option period
expired.
The agreement was at best no more
than an option that was never exercised by
Myron Ch1'1/q ^ ^he bankruptcy trustee.
Hansen, Cook,
t.

;

-

Lamoreaux did not convey any interest

*

to be held .
never paid.

:i i lto ai 1 a g m : eemei it al 1 owing documents

escrow subject
Child w:

:

hild paying $ . * rr..

i OT

r* occupying the lanu nor
ocuments were escrowec

actual

possession

and

did

not

convex

* *

* •./

Alpine
. anc

.^

despite

receiving partial payment from McKetin
find buyers for the project so he could acquire the property and
effect a profitable business transaction.
A) I MI

I lii

1 iiL.t !, <!]>p(-<i idiiil ," 1 1 1 t" 1 ill suppor:

.

: * ^

claim of equitable conversion are distinguishable because they deceases in which the buyer had the use of the ] and and possess
line 1 out, Fnici
only

i-ime r. child's bankruptcy, the

interest

Traverse

interest in Mew Empire.

Mountain was

:

partnership

Because he liaci .1 part 1 a.1 . * . .=^.t 111 I ln.<

real estate, the bankruptcy court strong arm powers allowed them to
sell the entire mountain free and clear of liens subject
indebtedness.
o^

the

senior

Child incorrect

Traverse Mountain property

including

:

interest

roa I itY "In 1 I I 1-

lis bankruptcy
Empire

schedules

partners.

partnership interest

the contract wherein New Empire was to acquire the property from

:•
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Alpine Ltd.
The bankruptcy court never addressed the issue of what
portion of the property belonged to Mr. Child vs. other interested
parties.

The bankruptcy court's inherent powers allowed the

trustee to sell Traverse Mountain free and clear of liens subject
to appropriate senior indebtedness or allowing liens to attach to
proceeds.

Such action did not destroy either McKean or the other

members of the New Empire Group's rights against Alpine resulting
from Alpine's breach of contract in failing to convey property for
the cash it had received from McKean.

It did not take away from

plaintiff McKean his direct right to recover damages from Alpine
Ltd.

Neither Alpine Ltd. nor the partners of New Empire Group

other than Mr. Child were in bankruptcy.

However, the land which

was subject of the contract between Alpine and New Empire Group was
subject to the bankruptcy court's control because of Child's
partial interest.
The principle of equitable conversion has no application
because there was never a transfer of property to Child. The cause
of action of New Empire Group and McKean against Alpine for breach
of contract in failing to convey land or return the money upon the
breach by Alpine was never conveyed to Child.
The strong arm powers of the bankruptcy law allowed the
court to sell the property

free and clear of liens without

adjudicating whether claims against the property were legal,
equitable, or valid.

In 1985 the bankruptcy trustee sold the
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property

free

and

clear

of

liens

except

for

such

senior

indebtedness which was assumed by the buyer as part of its bid.
Therefore, plaintiff McKean could no longer assert an actual lien
on the property or claim a right to require specific performance.
The trustee's sale did prevent plaintiff from proceeding to recover
the land from Alpine Ltd. even though Alpine was the controlling
party of the consortium which acquired the property. There were no
excess proceeds against which McKean or New Empire could assert an
interest.

Plaintiff was forced to seek recovery of damages or

other equitable relief against either Alpine or the New Empire
Group.

In consideration of not being sued, the New Empire Group

assigned plaintiff their claim arising from Alpine's breach of
contract.
When the bankruptcy court sold the Traverse Mountain
property, it did not dispose of claims of creditors. The cause of
action remained. All that was lost was the security. Subsequently
the bankruptcy was dismissed without discharge.
U.S. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 349, provides that
dismissal of a case reinstates the voided liens, vacates the prior
orders, and revests the interest of parties as they were before the
commencement of the case. It becomes as if there was no bankruptcy
filed except to the extent that the court will not undo bona fide
sales

of

assets

acquired

in

good

faith

through

bankruptcy

proceedings.
Section 349 of the Bankruptcy Code (U.S.C. § 349) (copy

25
attached) shows the House and Senate Reports statements regarding
the legislative intent:

It reads:

The basic purpose of the subsection is to undo
the bankruptcy case, as far as practicable,
and to restore all property rights to the
position in which they were found at the
commencement of the case.
This does not
necessarily
encompass
undoing
sales of
property from the estate to a good faith
purchaser.
Courts have regularly held that dismissal of a bankruptcy
as far as practical restores everything to the condition it existed
in prior to the commencement of the bankruptcy.

In Neal v. First

Alabama Bank of Huntsville. N.A.. 443 So.2d 1254 (1983), this
principle is stated as follows:
Generally, the dismissal of a bankruptcy
proceeding is "limited in
its effect to
return things to the status quo ante."
9
Am.Jur.2d "Bankruptcy" §391 (1980). As far as
practicable, a dismissal operates to restore
all property rights "to the position in which
they were found at the commencement of the
case." Id. This limitation upon the effect
of a dismissal means that the bankruptcy
court's dismissal of the proceeding does not
amount to a judicial determination of the
issues which would have been covered in the
case.
See also McDonell v. Eqqestein, 357 N.W.2d 168.
Collier on Bankruptcy discussed

Section

349 of the

Bankruptcy Code with the following comments:
The objective of section 349(b) is to undo the
title 11 case, in so far as is practicable,
and to restore all property rights to the
position they occupied at the beginning of
such case.

In the case before the court, the plan by its own terms
because "null and void" when its conditions were not met.

The

bankruptcy plan became a nullity when the property sold at auction
for was for 1/4 of the sum set as the minimum acceptable selling
price in the approved plan.

Dismissal caused everyone to be

reinstated to his prior position except that the court could not
undo the effect of the lost security interests that were eliminated
with the trustee's sale of the land.

This left the secured

creditors without their security in the land.
In the Findings of Fact the court found:
32. Any remaining interest of Myron Child
in the Traverse Mountain property sold by the
bankruptcy trustee was abandoned by the
bankruptcy trustee pursuant to a court order
entered July 10, 1985. The bankruptcy trustee
had not exercised any option of Child to
acquire the interest of others in the Traverse
Mountain property or the June 1978 contract.
33.
The Child bankruptcy was dismissed
without discharge by the U.S. bankruptcy
trustee on February 25, 1988.
The U.S.
bankruptcy trustee took no action to void the
June 12, 1985, assignment given by Child [to]
McKean.
The effect of the dismissal of Childfs bankruptcy is that
all interests and claims without the land revert to the person who
had them before the bankruptcy was filed.

Defendants Cook,

Lamoreaux, and Hansen retained their interests in their cause of
action against Alpine.

These interests had been assigned to

plaintiff McKean.
The bankruptcy court is a court of equity.

With the
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dismissal of the Child bankruptcy without discharge, all parties
were restored to their legal rights to pursue claims except to the
extent that the court's sale of real property extinguished the
right of specific performance. It was not equitable that defendant
Alpine collect the $330,000 from McKean and then retain the land
which was to be released for said payment.

Such a wrongful

windfall goes against all principles of equity, whether adjudicated
through the bankruptcy court, this court, or just common sense.
Ill
PLAINTIFF'S CAUSE OF ACTION IS NOT AFFECTED
BY THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA BASED ON THE
FACTS, PARTIES, AND ISSUES BEFORE THIS COURT.
Appellants allege that since Myron Child's plan confirmed
by the bankruptcy court provided Child could sell the property for
a sum not less than $8 million and divide the property among
creditors, it barred any other claims.

This argument ignores the

plain facts that Child's bankruptcy plan failed, became null and
void, and his bankruptcy was dismissed.

It also ignores the fact

that plaintiff's claim is not primarily a claim against bankrupt
Myron Child.

It was a claim against Alpine Ltd. arising from a

contract between Alpine and New Empire Group.

At best, any order

of the bankruptcy court would apply only to Child's interest in the
property.
Appellants argue that the plan created a new contract
between the creditor and Child and cite cases to show that a
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confirmed

and

effectuated

plan

constitutes

a

new

contract.

However, they readily admit that the Child bankruptcy plan was
never completed and was breached when the property could not be
sold under the terms set forth in the plan.
became void.

By its own terms, it

The specific confirmed plan of Child (Exhibit 32,

page 28, attached as Exhibit "I" to appellants' brief) provides:
...[I]f for any reason whatsoever and
regardless of fault, the Approved Sale (for at
least $8,000,000) has not occurred on or
before July 25, 1984, the Plan and all
acceptances of the Plan and assumptions
pursuant to the Plan shall be void and of no
force or effect....
(Parenthesis portion
added)
The plan does not call for it to be voidable. It was simply void.
The property was not sold before the July 25, 1984, required date.
Subsequently, when the plan failed, the land was sold by the
bankruptcy court free and clear of liens at auction.

It was sold

by a subsequent order of the bankruptcy court at auction, not under
the confirmed plan.
defendant Alpine.

It was bought by a consortium headed by
Alpine purchased the property by assuming

certain senior indebtedness and paying some of the bankruptcy
trustee's costs.
Defendants rely on the case of Southmark Properties v.
Charles House Corporation, 742 F.2d.862 (5th Cir. 1984). Southmark
is readily distinguishable from the case at bar for the following
reasons:
1.

The plan as approved in the Southmark case was
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effectively completed without prejudice to the mortgage debtor,
2. All of the property was owned by the bankrupt debtor,
subject to the bank's mortgage.
3.

The parties in the Southmark post-bankruptcy action

were the same parties

(including the bankrupt) who were the

principal debtor and creditor in the bankruptcy proceeding.
4.

The same cause of action was the subject of the

bankruptcy court adjudication.
In the case at bar, the trial court correctly found that
Mr. Child's interest did not include the interests of the other New
Empire partners.

Consequently, even to the extent a contract

existed, it only affected Mr. Child's claims with Alpine. However,
the plan called for it to be void if its terms were not met.
plans terms were not met.

The

The rights of McKean or the New Empire

Group to pursue Alpine Ltd. for breach of contract were not
diminished.
assert

Neither McKean nor the New Empire Group had a duty to

claims against Alpine Ltd.

in Mr. Child's bankruptcy

proceedings. Distinguishing the Southmark case, the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals held in D-l Enterprises. Inc. v. Commercial State
Bank, 864 F.2d 36 (5th Cir. 1989) that counterclaims are not
compulsory in quick motion-and-hearing style contested matters as
they are in adversary matters.

See also prior ruling in same

matter at 852 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1988)
The Utah Supreme Court has continually held that in order
for res judicata to apply, the suits must involve the same parties

and the same cause of action.

See Schaer v. Utah Department of

Transportation, 657 P.2d 1337 (Utah 1983); Serr v. Rick Jensen
Construction, Inc., 743 P.2d 1202 (Utah 1987); Searle Brothers v.
Searle, 588 P.2d 689, 690 (Utah 1978) The Searle case applies a 4pronged test to res judicata which the court stated has been
adopted by most jurisdictions:
1.
Was the issue decided in the prior
adjudication identical with the one presented
in the action in question?
2.
Was there a final judgment on the
merits?
3. Was the party against whom the plea is
asserted a party or in privity with a party to
the prior adjudication?
4. Was the issue decided in the first case
competently, fully, and fairly litigated?
In the case before the court the parties and issues are
significantly different, and by no stretch of the imagination can
one claim that McKeanfs claim against Alpine was competently,
fully, or fairly litigated.

The principle of res judicata is

simply not applicable to the facts before the court.

The trial

court judge correctly recognized this in his Conclusion of Law 7
(Record, p. 682) which reads:
7. The doctrine of res judicata does not
apply to this case because the bankruptcy
proceedings did not release defendants McBride
and Alpine from their obligation to convey
land or refund all or part of the June 25,
1979, payment made by plaintiff. Furthermore,
Child's bankruptcy plan failed. There was not
an adjudication by the bankruptcy court of the
claims involved in this lawsuit which would

31
preclude plaintiff
defendants.

from proceeding

against

IV
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS WERE TIMELY FILED
WITHIN THE APPROPRIATE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
The trial court did not need to address the issue of the
exact date the statute of limitations began running because either
a four year or six year statute of limitations was complied with.
Defendants' claim that the statute of limitations began to run on
June 25, 1979, the day that McKean paid $330,000 in exchange for
property.

Plaintiff disputes the starting date because other

conditions occurred after the $330,000 payment was made including
McKean's selection of the specific land and Alpinefs resulting
failure to deliver the land.

In an action for possession of land,

the cause of action does not arise until right of possession has
been so challenged as to give rise to cause of action.
State, 572 P.2d 1374.

Ash v.

See also State ex rel. v. Intermountain

Farmers Association, 668 P.2d 503 (Utah 1983) However, if we take
the earliest possible day of breach (June 25, 1985), plaintiff's
action was still brought within 6 years.

The six year statute of

limitations as set forth in Utah Code Annotated § 78-12-23 provides
that it applies for an action upon any contract, obligation, or
liability founded upon writing (except those subject to the 8 year
statute under 78-12-22).
There are two written contracts upon which this action is
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based.

The contract between Alpine Ltd. and New Empire Group

provides for the release of the property upon payment of sums and
certain elections being made. McKean made the payment on behalf of
himself and New Empire Group on June 25, 1979. McKean also had his
own written contract with New Empire Group allowing him to acquire
the New Empire's interest in the Alpine contract.

Subsequently

McKean received a complete assignment of the New Empire Group's
cause of action.

In either scenario this action arises from a

written contract and the suit was filed timely.
Defendants claim that the statute of limitations should
be four years rather than six years.

It was not until 1985 when

the remedy of specific performance under the written contract was
barred by action of the bankruptcy court so that plaintiff could
proceed to seek an alternative remedy other than requiring delivery
of the land.

Plaintiff brought his action seeking dollar damages

or such further relief as the court deems just and equitable on
June 21, 1985.

(Finding of Fact 23, Record p. 677)

The trial court found that the six year statute of
limitations applied. However, the court further found that it made
no difference whether a shorter statute of limitations applied
because the bankruptcy proceedings tolled or stayed McKean's
ability to sue under the contract between February 25, 1982, and
the time of conveyance by the trustee of his interest in the
property on March 21, 1985.

(Conclusion of Law 8, Record, p. 683)

Utah Code Annotated § 78-12-41 specifically provides:
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When the commencement of an action is
stayed
by
injunction
or
a
statutory
prohibition the time of the continuance of the
injunction or prohibition is not part of the
time limited for the commencement of the
action.
The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the application of said tolling
provision in Citicorp Mortgage, Inc. v. Hardy, 834 P.2d 554 (Utah
1992) . Considering the period the statute was tolled, the action
was actually filed in less than three years from the earliest
possible date the statute of limitations could have commenced.
Having so decreed, the trial court did not have to address the
issue of the exact date of breach that would have started the
statute running.
Defendants argue that plaintiff's only cause of action
rested upon a right to recover the land. However, when loss of the
land or other circumstances make specific performance impossible,
the law allows the court to fashion an appropriate equitable
remedy. Until the security was lost through the bankruptcy court's
actions, the appropriate remedy would have been to recover the
land.

(See contract, Record, p. 14) During the bankruptcy period,

McKean could not proceed against the land because the automatic
stay provisions of the bankruptcy code, 11 U.S.C. § 362 prevented
any action that would seek to obtain possession or exercise control
over the subject land.

Said statute provides that:

[A] petition filed ... operates as a stay,
applicable to all entities, of ...
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(3) any act to obtain possession of
property of the estate or of property from the
estate or to exercise control over property of
the estate;
The statute also prevents any act to enforce any lien.
Defendants rely on the case of Brown v. Cleverly, 92 Utah
54 (1937) which is clearly distinguishable.
of a written contract.

It did not arise out

The Brown case was an equitable action to

impress a vendor lien based on an implied contract. The Brown case
has also been distinguished in subsequent cases. See Hardinae Co.
v. Eimco Corp.. 266 P.2d 494 (Utah 1954) and Juab County Department
of Public Welfare v. Summers, 426 P.2d 1 (Utah 1967).

These cases

hold that when doubt exists as to whether a transaction is under a
written contract or another basis, the longer rather than the
shorter period of limitation is to be preferred.
Appellee proceeded within a few weeks of the time the
property was sold by the bankruptcy court to commence this action
against Alpine Ltd.

Subsequently the Complaint was amended to

specifically name the general partners of Alpine by name as being
the responsible general partners.

Appellants argue that the

amendment specifically identifying the individuals who were general
partners was not timely.

However, the general partners were in

fact already parties in the suit because the general partnership
Alpine Ltd. was a defendant. There was an identity of interest by
these parties.

Rule 15(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

discusses the amending of pleadings so the amendment relates to the
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date of the original pleading.

In Doxey-Layton Company v. Clark,

548 P.2d 902, 906, the Utah Supreme Court stated:
There is an exception to this rule. The
exception operates where there is a relation
back, as to both plaintiff and defendant, when
new and old parties have an identity of
interest; so it can be assumed or proved the
relation back is not prejudicial.
The
rationale underpinning this exception is one
which obstructs a mechanical use of a statute
of limitations; to prevent adjudication of a
claim. Such is particularly valid where, as
here, the real parties in interest were
sufficiently alerted to the proceedings, or
were involved in them unofficially, from an
early stage.
In the case at bar, by naming the general partnership the
general partners were unofficially involved from the commencement
of the action. The statute of limitations has been fully complied
with by the plaintiff, whether it is a six year or a four year
statute, and whether the individual partners were named in the
original or the amended complaint.

The conclusion of law of the

trial judge finding the action was timely brought within the
appropriate statute of limintations should be affirmed.
V
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT DEFENDANTS
DID NOT HAVE SUMS OWING THEM WHICH THEY WOULD BE
ENTITLED TO OFFSET
Appellants1

argument that it was a right of setoff

ignores the fact that the court found there was not a setoff.
Defendant Alpine failed to deliver land for payment received.
There was a breach of contract by Alpine Ltd. when Alpine received
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$330,000 and refused to deliver land. At the time of breach there
was no money owing to Alpine by McKean or by New Empire Group. The
fact that New Empire Group did not make payments in subsequent
years is totally immaterial.

It was not expected that once the

contract was breached by Alpine that New Empire would be expected
to pay additional funds when Alpine had not, could not or would not
perform

its duties under the contract.

Once the breach was

established, further payments did not accrue.

In Finding of Fact

28, the court specifically found that "[a]s of June 25, 1979, the
New Empire Group was current in all of its payments and was not in
default in the material conditions of the June 1, 1978, contract
with defendants Alpine and Michael McBride."

The court held in

Conclusions of Law 2 and 3 as follows:
2. Upon payment of the $330,000 on June
25, 1979, and the designation of property to
be released, plaintiff satisfied the New
Empire Group's obligations under the Contract
with the defendants. As of June 25, 1979,
defendant Alpine had an unconditional duty to
either convey land or refund the $330,000
payment Alpine received that day. Defendant
Alpine Ltd. breached its contract by failing
to convey land of $220,000 value as contracted
or to refund the $330,000 payment paid on June
25, 1979.
3.
After defendants McBride and Alpine
Ltd. breached their contract with New Empire
by failing to release land, New Empire and
Richard McKean were not obligated to perform
other duties under the contract or make other
payments until Alpine Ltd. had performed its
duties to release designated land as per the
terms of the contract.
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There being no right of setoff against the breach of
contract, the cases cited by appellants have no application in this
case. Any right of setoff arising from other relationships between
the parties, if they existed, was not pled or made a part of these
proceedings and certainly does not pertain to plaintiff McKean.
CONCLUSION
Defendants1 issues on appeal have been made moot by the
defendants1

actions in acquiring plaintiff's interest in this

matter and satisfying the judgment. The appeal should be dismissed
and the matter remanded to the District Court for determination of
the amount of the plaintiff's attorney's lien which is secured by
the property bond pledged by defendants.

In the event the matter

is not determined to be moot, the appeal should be denied on the
merits for the reasons stated herein with costs awarded to the
plaintiff.

The court's findings of fact are not at issue and

should be accepted. Based on the undisputed facts, the conclusions
of law and judgment of the trial judge should be affirmed.
DATED this

day of September 1993.
Respectfully submitted,

RALPH R. TATE, JR.
Attorney for Appellee
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ADDENDUM
Pertinent Documents
The determinative bankruptcy statutes, Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, Judgment, and pertinent contracts are attached
to defendants/appellants1 brief and therefore are not duplicated.
The following additional documents and statutes are
attached hereto:
11 U.S.C. § 349
Utah Code Annotated 78-12-41
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order on
Pending Motions, dated May 5, 1993 (after special
hearing on temporary remand from this court)

BANKRUPTCY CODE

154

ier Bankruptcy Manual Ch. 348 (3d ed. 1986).
ler Bankruptcy Practice Guide Ch. 37 (1986).
SECTION 349 (11 U.S.C. §349)
19.

Effect of dismissal.

Unless the court, for cause, orders otherwise, the
ssal of a case under this title does not bar the discharge,
iter case under this title, of debts that were dischargable
case dismissed; nor does the dismissal of a case under
itle prejudice the debtor with regard to the filing of a
juent petition under this title, except as provided in
n 109(f) of this title.
Unless the court, for cause, orders otherwise, a dismissal
3ase other than under section 742 of this title—
(1) reinstates—
( A ) any proceeding or custodianship
under section 543 of this title;

superseded

( B ) any transfer avoided under section 522, 544, 545,
547, 548, 549, or 724(a) of this title, or preserved under
section 510(c)(2), 522(i)(2), or 551 of this title; and
(C) any lien voided under section 506(d) of this title;
(2) vacates any order, judgment, or transfer ordered,
nder section 5 2 2 ( i ) ( l ) , 542, 550, or 553 of this title; and
(3) revests the property of the estate in the entity in
hich such property was vested immediately before the
>mmencement of the case under this title.

Legislative History
section (a) specifies that unless the court for cause orders
ise, the dismissal of a case is without prejudice. The debtor is
rred from receiving a discharge in a later case of debts that
ischargeable in the case dismissed. Of course, this subsection
only to pre-discharge dismissals. If the debtor has already
id a discharge and it is not revoked, then the debtor would be
under section 727(a) from receiving a discharge in a
uent liquidation case for six years. Dismissal of an involunI the merits will generally not give rise to adequate cause so as
the debtor from further relief.
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CASE ADMINISTRATION

§ 349

or custodianships that were superseded by the bankruptcy case,
reinstates avoided transfers, reinstates voided liens, vacates any
order, judgment, or transfer ordered as a result of the avoidance of a
transfer, and revests the property of the estate in the entity in which
the property was vested at the commencement of the case. The court
is permitted to order a different result for cause.[The basic purpose
of the subsection is to undo the bankruptcy case, as far as
practicable, and to restore all property rights to the position in which
they were found at the commencement of the case. This does not
necessarily encompass undoing sales of property from the estate to a
good faith purchaser. Where there is a question over the scope of the
subsection, the court will make the appropriate orders to protect
rights acquired in reliance on the bankruptcy case.
[House Report No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 337-38 (1977); Senate
Report No. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 48-9 (1978). ]
Section 349(b)(2) of the House amendment adds a cross reference
to section 553 to reflect the new right of recovery of setoffs created
under that section. Corresponding changes are made throughout the
House amendment.
[124 Cong. Rec. S 17,408 (Oct. 6, 1978).]

Comment
Section 742, referred to in subsection (b) of section 349 deals with
SIPA cases and provides for dismissal of the case if SIPC completes
liquidation of the debtor.
Section 506(d) referred to in subsection (b)(1)(C) provides that to
the extent a secured claim is not allowed, its lien is void except under
certain specified circumstances.
Former Bankruptcy Rule 120(c), entitled "Effect of Dismissal"
merely provided that unless the order specified to the contrary, a
dismissal of a case otherwise than on the merits was without
prejudice. There was no comparable provision in the Act. Prior to the
rule, dismissal often operated harshly against the debtor. See, e.g.. In
re Frey, 95 F . Supp. 1007 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
Section 17b of the Act provided that failure of a bankrupt or
debtor to obtain a discharge in a prior bankruptcy case for certain
specified reasons should not bar the release by discharge in a
subsequent case under the Act of debts that were dischargeable in the
prior case. One of the specified reasons was dismissal of the prior
case without prejudice for failure to pay filing fees or to secure
costs.
Section 67a, relating to avoidance of judicial liens had a proviso to
the effect that if the bankrupt or debtor was not finally adjudged a
bankrupt and if no arrangement or plan was proposed or confirmed,
the nullified lien would be deemed reinstated with the same effect as
if it had not been nullified and voided.
Bankruptcy Rule 1017 deals with dismissal or suspension of a case.

LIMITATION OF ACTIONS
brought within specified time after failure of
prior action for cause other than on the merits,
16 A.L.R.3d 452.

78-12-43

Key Numbers. — Limitations of Actions <&=
130.

78-12-41. Effect of injunction or prohibition.
When the commencement of an action is stayed by injunction or a statutory
prohibition the time of the continuance of the injunction or prohibition is not
part of the time limited for the commencement of the action.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-12-41.

Cross-References. — Injunctions, Rule
65A, U.R.C.P.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitation
of Actions §§ 170, 171.
C.J.S. — 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions
§§ 124, 125.

Key Numbers. — Limitation of Actions «=
111.
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Attorney for Plaintiff
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
Telephone: 278-4747

MAY 0 5 1993
rrfcyCO-.if-iY

.i^fc^B.^

UJpuiy Ckik

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
RICHARD F. McKEAN,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND
ORDER ON PENDING MOTIONS

vs.
MICHEAL W. McBRIDE, ALPINE LTD.,
FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE
INSURANCE COMPANY, GEODYNE II, a
Utah general partnership, DAN C.
SIMONS, and ARDEN J. BODELL,

Civil No. C85-4003
(Judge Rokich)

Defendants.

The above matter came before this court before the Honorable John A.
Rokich on March 9, 1993, at 10:00 a.m. for the following matters:
1.

On the temporary remand from the Utah Court of Appeals for the

trial court to rule on issues raised in plaintiffs Motion for Court Order Vacating Full
Satisfaction of Judgment, Ordering Satisfaction Not To Issue Until Attorney's Lien is
Paid, Dismissing Defendants' Appeal, Enjoining Transfer of Assets Pledged in Lieu of
Supersedeas Bond Until Attorney's Lien is Paid, and for Other Extraordinary Relief.
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2.

On plaintiffs Motion for Equitable Relief Determining Satisfaction

of Judgment Is Only a Partial Satisfaction of Judgment and Ordering that Assets
Pledged ify Lieu of Supersedeas Bond not be Released Until Attorney's Lien Has Been
Paid.
3.

On defendants' Motion to Release Undertaking and Pledge.

Plaintiff was represented by Ralph R. Tate, Jr.

Defendants were

represented by R. Stephen Marshall of Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy. The
court having considered the respective memoranda and affidavits filed in connection
with the motions and legal argument of counsel at the hearing, good cause appearing,
hereby enters the following Findings of Fact which were undisputed by the parties.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The following facts were undisputed by the parties as shown by the
memoranda on file and stipulation of counsel in open court:
1.

Subsequent to a bench trial on September 18, 1991, the Hon.

John Rokich entered a judgment in favor of plaintiff and against defendants for the
sum of $485,689.76 together with accruing interest after July 22, 1991, and court
costs incurred.
2.

Pursuant to a written agreement ("the fee agreement") between

plaintiff and attorney Ralph R. Tate Jr. ("Tate"), Tate claims an attorney's Ken on the
cause of action and the proceeds therefrom. A copy of the Notice of Attorney's Lien
was initially filed with the Third Judicial District Court on September 11, 1990, and
was amended April 17, 1992. Pursuant to the fee agreement plaintiff agreed to pay as
088N33181.1
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attorney's fees "30% of any sums recovered after legal action is filed but before any
appeal is filed or before commencement of a second trial; 35% of any sums recovered
if a second trial or appeal is necessary.... [A]ttorney Ralph R. Tate, Jr. shall have a
hen on my cause of action or any proceeds received to secure payment of the
attorney's fees agreed to herein.11 A copy of the fee agreement is attached to the
Affidavit of Merlyn Hanks dated February 11, 1993, and filed with this court.
3.

Defendants filed an appeal which is presently pending before the

Utah State Court of Appeals as Case No. 920705-CA which has not been dismissed. A
motion to have the appeal dismissed and related motions were filed on January 15,
1993, and are pending before the Utah Court of Appeals.
4.

A court order was signed by Judge John Rokich on March 20,

1992, pursuant to stipulation between plaintiff McKean and defendants which
provided a stay of execution in lieu of a supersedeas bond, provided that certain assets
would be pledged as security to provide payment of the judgment upon appeal
affirmation. Pursuant to said Stipulation, documents were executed and filed that
gave public notice and perfected the security interests with the Clerk of the Court as
the secured party. Said order restrained the transfer of certain assets by the
defendants.
5.

WestOne Bank, as the successor to FMA Thrift and Loan Company

and Moore Financial Company obtained a judgment against Richard McKean in an
action filed in the First District Court, Box Elder County, State of Utah, entitled FMA
Thrift and Loan Company, now known as Moore Financial Company of Utah, vs.
088X33181.1
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Alpha Leasing Company, a Utah general partnership consisting of Dorius E. Black,
Joseph Cannon. McKean Equipment Company. Inc., McKean Construction Company,
Inc.. Gritton and Associates, Richard J. McKean. Robert P. Ap^ood. and Rex J. Black,
et al., Civil No. 17754.
6.

On September 28, 1991, WestOne Bank assigned its interest in

the judgment obtained in the WestOne Bank action to Delaware Funding & Guaranty.
Delaware thereafter executed on the judgment against McKean in the WestOne Bank
action by causing the judgment in the present case to be sold at an execution sale
conducted by the Salt Lake County Sheriff. Delaware, acting in the name of WestOne
Bank, purchased the judgment at the sale by bidding $10,000.00 of the WestOne
judgment.
7.

At the sheriffs sale and prior to bidding, plaintiff McKean's

attorney Ralph Tate announced to all present that the judgment was subject to an
attorney's lien of approximately $185,000 together with accruing interest. Because of
said execution sale, Delaware now claims to be the successor to plaintiff McKean's
interest in this matter.
8.

Richard A. Christensen is the president of Delaware Funding and

Guaranty. Richard A. Christenson is also the President of Franklin Financial, a Utah
corporation. Franklin Financial and defendant Geodyne II are general partners of TR
Investments, Ltd., a Utah Limited Partnership. Defendant Alpine, Ltd., is a limited
partner of TR Investments. The collateral pledged as security in this matter includes
50% of Alpine Ltd.'s interest in TR Investments, Ltd.

9.

On January 8, 1993, Richard A. Christenson, representing himself

to be acting as president of Delaware Funding & Guaranty (referred to herein as
"Delaware") which claimed to be a successor to the plaintiffs interest, executed and
filed a Satisfaction of Judgment with the court.
10.

The Satisfaction of Judgment filed by Christenson indicates that

Delaware and Richard Christenson entered into an agreement to settle the matter with
"defendants pursuant to an Agreement and Assignment between the parties."
11.

On January 8, 1993, defendants Alpine Ltd. Dan Simons and

Arden J. Bodell and Geodyne II entered into that certain Agreement and Assignment
with Delaware Funding and Guaranty, a Delaware corporation. A copy of the
Agreement and Assignment is attached to the Affidavit of Merlyn Hanks dated
February 11, 1993, and filed with this court.
12.

As attorney of record for plaintiff, Tate had no knowledge of any

agreement or assignment between the parties until January 13, 1993, and has not
consented to the satisfaction of the judgment and has not been paid any sums
pursuant to his attorney's lien on file herein.
13.

The parties through their respective attorneys stipulated in open

court that the assets which have been pledged in lieu of a supersedeas bond would not
be released without further order of the court after an equitable action to be filed by
plaintiffs counsel as to the validity and amount of plaintiffs counsel's attorneys lien is
determined.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
088X33181.1
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From the foregoing stipulated Findings of Fact, the court enters the
following Conclusions of Law.
1.

While the court has the discretion to allow an equitable action to

be brought in this proceeding for determination of attorney's lien and the effect of the
satisfaction of judgment, the preferred procedure would be to have a separate
equitable action filed where all issues may be raised and all entities who may have a
responsibility for the payment of the attorney's fees or the filing of the satisfaction of
judgment may be named as parties to the proceeding.
2.

The court concludes that in consideration of the stipulation of the

parties and the equities in this case, the security that has been pledged in lieu of a
supersedeas bond should remain on deposit with the clerk of the court and not be
released until further order of the court after an equitable action to be filed by
plaintiffs counsel as to the validity and amount of plaintiffs counsel's attorneys lien is
determined.
WHEREFORE, it is hereby ORDERED as follows:
1.

Plaintiffs Motion for Motion for Equitable Relief Determining

Satisfaction of Judgment Is Only a Partial Satisfaction of Judgment is denied without
prejudice with leave to bring a separate equitable action.
2.

Defendants' Motion to Release Undertaking and Pledge and

plaintiffs Motion for Order that Assets Pledged in Lieu of Supersedeas Bond not be
Released Until Attorney's Lien Has Been Paid shall be reserved for further
consideration after final court determination or resolution of the independent action in
088X33181.1
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equity to be filed by plaintiff seeking to determine the effect of counsel's attorney's
lien and the amount of said lien.
3.

Pursuant to the order of the Court of Appeals dated February 16,

1993, the clerk of the court shall prepare a supplemental record consisting of the
proceedings on temporary remand for certification and transmittal to the Court of
Appeals.
DATED this

c ^ d a y of May, 1993.
BY THE COURT:

Approved as to form:

R. SteJ>hin Marshall
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